Long time since my last post. I was very busy creating Cyber Saiyan – a non-profit organization – and organizing RomHack 2018, a free cyber security event that will take place in Rome next September 22th.
On the field of threat intelligence automation and info sharing community building, the work continued too.
I’m working hard with italian community and we setup a STIX/TAXII network using a combination of open source sofware: MISP, OpenTAXII and MineMeld. We are now testing a complex consumer/producer network where companies (producers) can push IoC that, after validation, are injected into the consumer network, a TAXII service built on top of MineMeld.
Sabato 13 Gennaio 2018 sono stato relatore, insieme ad amici e colleghi bravissimi, della prima edizione del BSides Roma con un talk dal titolo “Building an Effective Info Sharing Community“.
L’evento è stato un successo: sala piena e livello dei talk notevole – a parte il mio ovviamente 🙂
Tutto è iniziato a Gennaio 2017 quando a Milano ho conosciuto Mario Anglani, l’organizzatore di HackInBo. Quel giorno quando Mario mi ha parlato di HackInBo, incuriosito, ho deciso di avvicinarmi a questa community inviando una mia proposta di talk per l’imminente spring edition 2017.
inizio by Marco Scandella (flickr)
Non avevo troppe speranze a dire il vero, ma la voglia di raccontare la mia esperienza, le mie idee e confrontarmi con altre persone – fino ad allora sconosciute – era grandissima.
Il mio talk fuselezionato e per me è stata un’esperienza stupenda ed indimenticabile che mi ha permesso di conoscere tantissime persone e di condividere con loro idee, problemi e soluzioni. Un “mondo” per me sconosciuto fino ad allora – lavoravo comunque nella Security operativamente da quasi 6 anni – e che mi ha immediatamente conquistato.
In questi sei mesi sono successe tantissime cose che mi hanno convinto di tentare di restituire alla community – il famoso give back – un po’ di quello che ho “preso”. E così insieme ad altri amici – DavideP e Federico – abbiamo prima di tutto deciso di costituire un’associazione di promozione sociale che abbiamo chiamato Cyber Saiyan (sito web , twitter) che “persegue la promozione di iniziative di qualsiasi genere con la finalità di divulgare tematiche relative a cyber security ed ethical hacking“.
Presto organizzeremo qui a Roma un incontro per presentare l’associazione, con l’obiettivo minimo di realizzare nel 2018 un evento di sicurezza su Roma che abbia il pieno supporto della community.
Oggi per me è un nuovo inizio e spero che nel 2018 Cyber Saiyan possa regalarci delle stupende iniziative.
After building the architecture and integrating the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA into MineMeld and the near-real-time SOC engine, it’s time to put another brick to build an effective community: export internal IoC to the community in a standard format so authorized parties can get it and use them as they want.
STIX/TAXII Network
The ultimate goal is to build a community that can share IoC using a standard language and a transport mechanism (STIX/TAXXI) getting data from heterogeneous sources (more integration examples in next posts) and injecting data into the community network.
On the first post of my threat intelligence automation jurney I wrote why I choosed MineMeld, the architecture implemented and the hardening steps. One of the goals is to connect MineMeld to heterogeneous external sources to get IoC (Indicators of Compromise) and integrate it into our i-SOC (Information Security Operation Center) near-real-timeengine to get evidences of security events to be analyzed by i-SOC analysts.
In this post I show the foundation of the threat intelligence automation model: how I wrote a custom prototype to get the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA (Public Administration – italian web site) and how I integrated these feeds into Splunk near-real-time engine.
I started with this integration because InfoSec has very good feeds (IP, URLs, domains) that are not just copy&paste from OSINT sources but are often updated and automatically analyzed to check that IoC are still “alive”.
Last slide at my HackInBo talk (italian) was about how to automatically integrate threat intelligence feeds into our near-real-time Information Security Operation Center (i-SOC) SPLUNK engine to reduce the timespent by SOC security analysts on IoC (Indicators of Compromise) analysis.
Threat Intelligence question from #HiB17
At the time I was testing an open source project from PaloAlto: MineMeld. It was the right choice; after extensive tests MineMeld now help me to solve the challenges I had in the past while playing with IoC coming from various threat intelligence sources: collection automation, unduplication, aging and SOC integration.
Di seguito il video del mio talk “L’evoluzione del SOC di una infrastruttura critica” tenuto a Maggio 2017 ad HackInBo Spring Edition 2017 (qui le slides).
In the previous post I described how our Security Operation Center managed the WannaCry news.
We also made a lot of side activities in the past hours and one of these was to implement an internal sinkholing of the killswitch servers in case some clients where infected; with a working local sinkholing we where able to avoid the ransomware spreading in case of infection.
In the past hours a new ransomware called WannaCry (or WCry or WannaCrypt0) spread very fast on Internet and targeted a lot of public and private organizations. The ransomware make use of public exploits related to the last Shadow Brokers leak, in particular MS17-010 vulnerability that was fixed by Microsoft on March 14 (2 months ago). You can read very good tech posts here, here, here and here and I suggest you also to follow on twitter Hacker Fantastic and Malware Tech.
Here I try to summarize my approach to the news, mainly highlighting what we did in my company in the past months and how we monitored WCry from our SOC (Security Operation Center).
There was (and there is also now) a lot of hysteria, but for people like me that work in a SOC this is not an acceptable mood; you need to relax, really understand what’s happening and verify that what you did before is enough and, if not, apply emergency countermeasures. Continue reading “The WannaCry journey from a SOC point of view”→
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