After having laid the foundations for building a community with the previous posts, it’s now time to make some advanced analysis of the received IoC.
In post 2 I integrated MineMeld output nodes into Splunk SOC near-real-time engine to automate SOC IoC access detection. This configuration strengthens the analysis and response capabilities of our SOC.
With this post I show you how to integrate MineMeld miners IoC events (update and withdraw of remote IoC) into Splunk engine so you can use Splunk search advanced features to have a deeper look into the IoC received from the miners.
This is also an important information for a SOC because if you have an IoC hit the first think to do is to understand where the IoC come from, if it was sent by more than one source etc
On the first post of my threat intelligence automation jurney I wrote why I choosed MineMeld, the architecture implemented and the hardening steps. One of the goals is to connect MineMeld to heterogeneous external sources to get IoC (Indicators of Compromise) and integrate it into our i-SOC (Information Security Operation Center) near-real-timeengine to get evidences of security events to be analyzed by i-SOC analysts.
In this post I show the foundation of the threat intelligence automation model: how I wrote a custom prototype to get the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA (Public Administration – italian web site) and how I integrated these feeds into Splunk near-real-time engine.
I started with this integration because InfoSec has very good feeds (IP, URLs, domains) that are not just copy&paste from OSINT sources but are often updated and automatically analyzed to check that IoC are still “alive”.
In the previous post I described how our Security Operation Center managed the WannaCry news.
We also made a lot of side activities in the past hours and one of these was to implement an internal sinkholing of the killswitch servers in case some clients where infected; with a working local sinkholing we where able to avoid the ransomware spreading in case of infection.
In the past hours a new ransomware called WannaCry (or WCry or WannaCrypt0) spread very fast on Internet and targeted a lot of public and private organizations. The ransomware make use of public exploits related to the last Shadow Brokers leak, in particular MS17-010 vulnerability that was fixed by Microsoft on March 14 (2 months ago). You can read very good tech posts here, here, here and here and I suggest you also to follow on twitter Hacker Fantastic and Malware Tech.
Here I try to summarize my approach to the news, mainly highlighting what we did in my company in the past months and how we monitored WCry from our SOC (Security Operation Center).
There was (and there is also now) a lot of hysteria, but for people like me that work in a SOC this is not an acceptable mood; you need to relax, really understand what’s happening and verify that what you did before is enough and, if not, apply emergency countermeasures. Continue reading “The WannaCry journey from a SOC point of view”→
[ Qui potete trovare slides e video del mio intervento ]
Il 6 e 7 Maggio prossimi parteciperò come relatore ad HackInBo, un evento sulla Sicurezza Informatica totalmente gratuito che si svolge due volte l’anno a Bologna, ed organizzato in maniera del tutto volontaria dal buon Mario ed il suo staff.
HackInBo si differenzia in maniera netta dagli eventi organizzati qua e la dai vari vendor ed integratori di soluzioni di Sicurezza in quanto viene “dal basso”, è organizzato cioè da un gruppo di amici che lo fa per pura passione. Per dire: gli sponsor non possono parlare, saranno ovviamente (e giustamente) ringraziati ma l’unico vantaggio è il posto in prima fila. Continue reading “[ITA] HackInBo Spring Edition 2017”→