Squid can be configured to make SSL/TLS inspection (aka HTTPS interception) so the proxy can decrypt proxied traffic (Squid calls this feature ssl bump).
Afaik the Squid package included in the Linux distros is not compiled with SSL/TLS inspection support but the good news is that diladele (its github repo and Websafetydocumentation are useful resources) provides packages for Ubuntu and Centos, recompiled (you can do by yourself) with support for HTTPS filtering and SSL/TLS inspection. This means that we have just to configure Squid. Not an easy task anyway 🙂
I provide to you a working config, follow next steps.
Phishing is a common attack characterized by simplicity and effectiveness; phishing emails are used to drop malware, cryptolocker, steal credentials… and they are successfull just because Dave. I suggest reading this page to understand “the existing forms of phishing attacks and the currently available mitigations“.
Companies – hopefully – train their employees with internal phishing campaigns; in this post I show how we can build a simple office document that – once opened – sends information to an external server. We can use the document – along with Gophish or other tools – to build our own phishing campaign and test our organization exposure to phishing, teaching people and rising awareness.
After having laid the foundations for building a community with the previous posts, it’s now time to make some advanced analysis of the received IoC.
In post 2 I integrated MineMeld output nodes into Splunk SOC near-real-time engine to automate SOC IoC access detection. This configuration strengthens the analysis and response capabilities of our SOC.
With this post I show you how to integrate MineMeld miners IoC events (update and withdraw of remote IoC) into Splunk engine so you can use Splunk search advanced features to have a deeper look into the IoC received from the miners.
This is also an important information for a SOC because if you have an IoC hit the first think to do is to understand where the IoC come from, if it was sent by more than one source etc
After building the architecture and integrating the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA into MineMeld and the near-real-time SOC engine, it’s time to put another brick to build an effective community: export internal IoC to the community in a standard format so authorized parties can get it and use them as they want.
The ultimate goal is to build a community that can share IoC using a standard language and a transport mechanism (STIX/TAXXI) getting data from heterogeneous sources (more integration examples in next posts) and injecting data into the community network.
On the first post of my threat intelligence automation jurney I wrote why I choosed MineMeld, the architecture implemented and the hardening steps. One of the goals is to connect MineMeld to heterogeneous external sources to get IoC (Indicators of Compromise) and integrate it into our i-SOC (Information Security Operation Center) near-real-timeengine to get evidences of security events to be analyzed by i-SOC analysts.
In this post I show the foundation of the threat intelligence automation model: how I wrote a custom prototype to get the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA (Public Administration – italian web site) and how I integrated these feeds into Splunk near-real-time engine.
I started with this integration because InfoSec has very good feeds (IP, URLs, domains) that are not just copy&paste from OSINT sources but are often updated and automatically analyzed to check that IoC are still “alive”.
Last slide at my HackInBo talk (italian) was about how to automatically integrate threat intelligence feeds into our near-real-time Information Security Operation Center (i-SOC) SPLUNK engine to reduce the timespent by SOC security analysts on IoC (Indicators of Compromise) analysis.
At the time I was testing an open source project from PaloAlto: MineMeld. It was the right choice; after extensive tests MineMeld now help me to solve the challenges I had in the past while playing with IoC coming from various threat intelligence sources: collection automation, unduplication, aging and SOC integration.