Il tema del mio intervento è qualcosa a cui tengo molto, ovvero l’Information Sahring: “Building an Effective Info Sharing Community”.
Nel talk cercherò di ricostruire in maniera sistematica e strutturata il lavoro fatto in questi mesi e già in parte descritto qui sul blog in una serie di post.
Sono convinto che per Roma è un’occasione importante per portare un po’ di sana “ciccia” (come si dice da queste parti) sulla scena della Security romana. Da parte mia sono davvero contento di dare il mio contributo e spero che in tanti supportino questa iniziativa partecipandovi.
Qui la ricca agenda dell’evento e qui la pagina per la registrazione.
After having laid the foundations for building a community with the previous posts, it’s now time to make some advanced analysis of the received IoC.
In post 2 I integrated MineMeld output nodes into Splunk SOC near-real-time engine to automate SOC IoC access detection. This configuration strengthens the analysis and response capabilities of our SOC.
With this post I show you how to integrate MineMeld miners IoC events (update and withdraw of remote IoC) into Splunk engine so you can use Splunk search advanced features to have a deeper look into the IoC received from the miners.
This is also an important information for a SOC because if you have an IoC hit the first think to do is to understand where the IoC come from, if it was sent by more than one source etc
After building the architecture and integrating the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA into MineMeld and the near-real-time SOC engine, it’s time to put another brick to build an effective community: export internal IoC to the community in a standard format so authorized parties can get it and use them as they want.
The ultimate goal is to build a community that can share IoC using a standard language and a transport mechanism (STIX/TAXXI) getting data from heterogeneous sources (more integration examples in next posts) and injecting data into the community network.
On the first post of my threat intelligence automation jurney I wrote why I choosed MineMeld, the architecture implemented and the hardening steps. One of the goals is to connect MineMeld to heterogeneous external sources to get IoC (Indicators of Compromise) and integrate it into our i-SOC (Information Security Operation Center) near-real-timeengine to get evidences of security events to be analyzed by i-SOC analysts.
In this post I show the foundation of the threat intelligence automation model: how I wrote a custom prototype to get the InfoSec feeds from italian CERT-PA (Public Administration – italian web site) and how I integrated these feeds into Splunk near-real-time engine.
I started with this integration because InfoSec has very good feeds (IP, URLs, domains) that are not just copy&paste from OSINT sources but are often updated and automatically analyzed to check that IoC are still “alive”.
Last slide at my HackInBo talk (italian) was about how to automatically integrate threat intelligence feeds into our near-real-time Information Security Operation Center (i-SOC) SPLUNK engine to reduce the timespent by SOC security analysts on IoC (Indicators of Compromise) analysis.
At the time I was testing an open source project from PaloAlto: MineMeld. It was the right choice; after extensive tests MineMeld now help me to solve the challenges I had in the past while playing with IoC coming from various threat intelligence sources: collection automation, unduplication, aging and SOC integration.
In the previous post I described how our Security Operation Center managed the WannaCry news.
We also made a lot of side activities in the past hours and one of these was to implement an internal sinkholing of the killswitch servers in case some clients where infected; with a working local sinkholing we where able to avoid the ransomware spreading in case of infection.
In the past hours a new ransomware called WannaCry (or WCry or WannaCrypt0) spread very fast on Internet and targeted a lot of public and private organizations. The ransomware make use of public exploits related to the last Shadow Brokers leak, in particular MS17-010 vulnerability that was fixed by Microsoft on March 14 (2 months ago). You can read very good tech posts here, here, here and here and I suggest you also to follow on twitter Hacker Fantastic and Malware Tech.
Here I try to summarize my approach to the news, mainly highlighting what we did in my company in the past months and how we monitored WCry from our SOC (Security Operation Center).
There was (and there is also now) a lot of hysteria, but for people like me that work in a SOC this is not an acceptable mood; you need to relax, really understand what’s happening and verify that what you did before is enough and, if not, apply emergency countermeasures. Continue reading “The WannaCry journey from a SOC point of view”→
Il 6 e 7 Maggio ho partecipato come relatore alla Spring Edition di HackInBo e per me sono stati tre giorni molto molto intensi e carichi di emozioni.
Prima di tutto orgogliosamente abbiamo raccolto 1700€ per i progetti della Onlus “Non Basta un Sorriso“; questo è il vero successo di questa edizione (il target prefissato era di 1200€). Kudos a Gianluca Varisco che si è trasformato in chierichetto acaro e ha raccolto le offerte da tutta la platea (quasi 500 persone). Bravi tutti!!!!
Poi i necessari ringraziamenti a Mario Anglani, instancabile organizzatore, e a tutti i ragazzi dell’organizzazione (povero Riccardo che mi ha sopportato più degli altri). Questa volta il gadget per i partecipanti era una bottiglia di birra al miele (e coordinato boccale) prodotta dal birrificio Valsusa in collaborazione con la Onlus Educatamente. Per tutti i partecipanti poi a disposizione uno stand per degustare la suddetta birra gratuitamente.
Le slides del mio intervento “L’evoluzione del SOC di un’infrastruttura critica” sono state pubblicate insieme a quelle di tutti gli altri relatori sul sito di HackInBo e le riporto anche qui di seguito.